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The Devil You Know: The Effects of Identifiability on Punishment
Abstract
Prior research has confirmed Thomas Schelling's observation that people are more sympathetic and
hence generous toward specific identified victims than toward “statistical” victims who are yet to be
identified. In the study presented in this article we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness. We
find that people are more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but unidentified,
wrongdoers, even when identifying the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information about him or her.
To account for the effect of identifiability on both generosity and punitiveness, we propose that affective
reactions of any type are stronger toward an identified than toward an unidentified target. Consistent with
such an account, the effect of identifiability on punishing behavior was mediated by self‐reported anger.
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Abstract
Prior research has found that people are more generous toward an identifiable
(determinate) victim than toward a statistical (indeterminate) victim. In the present study,
we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness. We find that people are more
punitive toward determinate wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but indeterminate,
wrongdoers, even when determining the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information
about him or her. To account for the effect of identifiability on both generosity and
punitiveness, we propose that affective reactions of any type are stronger toward a
determinate than toward an unidentified target. Consistent with such an account, the
effect of determinateness on punishing behavior was mediated by anger and blame.
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…it is in particular instances only that the propriety or impropriety, the merit or
demerit, of actions is very obvious or discernible…..When we consider virtue and
vice in an abstract and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these
several sentiments seem in a great measure to disappear, and the sentiments
themselves becomes less obvious and discernable.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments
Past research has shown that human empathy differs reliably toward actual,
'identified', victims on the one hand, and more abstract or 'statistical' victims on the other
(Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). As
Schelling (1968) wrote in what may have been the first explicit treatment of the
phenomenon, “the death of a particular person invokes “anxiety and sentiment, guilt and
awe, responsibility and religion, [but]…most of this awesomeness disappears when we
deal with statistical death.” Schelling’s passage not only identifies the phenomenon, but
also proposes a plausible psychological mechanism involving emotions. It suggests that
identifiable victims evoke sympathy and a sense of moral responsibility that is lacking in
considerations of statistical victims.
In this paper we examine whether the discrepancy in treatment of statistical and
identifiable victims noted by Schelling and supported by subsequent research might be a
special case of a more general phenomenon that could be termed an identifiable other
effect whereby any identifiable target evokes a stronger emotional and moral reaction
than an equivalent, but unidentifiable target. If identifiable targets of any type produce
stronger emotional reactions, then identification should also tend to intensify negative
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feelings, if these are the dominant emotional reactions to a target. This is the prediction
we test in the current paper.
Specifically, we test for an effect of identifiably on punitiveness, adapting a
research design borrowed from our earlier work on the identifiable victim effect (Small &
Loewenstein, 2003). The original design was intended to get around the problem that
identifying a victim generally means providing information about him or her, so it is
always possible that any observed increment in empathy toward identifiable victims
could be due to the specific information provided about the victim rather than to
identifiability per se. Our study avoided this problem by identifying victims without
providing any information about them, a manipulation that we called “determinateness.”
In one of the earlier studies, we assigned each member of a group of research
participants with a number and endowed each with $10. Based on a drawing of numbers,
half – the 'victims' -- were made to return the money. We then gave each of the
participants who had retained the $10 the opportunity to share their money with one of
those who had lost their endowment. In the determinate (identifiable) condition, the
potential giver first drew the number of one victim from a bag, then decided how much to
give to that victim (knowing, however, that he/she would never learn the actual identity
of the victim). In the indeterminate (unidentifiable) condition, in contrast, the potential
giver decided how much to give just before drawing the victim's number. Donations
were about twice as large, on average, in the determinate condition as in the
indeterminate condition, despite the fact that determining the victim provided no
information about them. Follow-up research, in which we raised money for the
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charitable organization "Habitat for Humanity," revealed a similar effect in a more
naturalistic setting.
Beyond generalizing the earlier work beyond reactions to victims, the current
study also examines whether any observed differences in the punitiveness exhibited
toward determinate and indeterminate perpetrators would be mediated by different
affective reactions. Adam Smith's assertion that "when we consider virtue and vice in an
abstract and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these several sentiments
seem in a great measure to disappear," as well as Schelling's contention that identified
victims evoke "anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe," both reveal an implicit theory that
identification matters because it leads to more intense emotional reactions. The work of
Sherman and colleagues (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Sherman, Beike and Ryalls,
1999) further supports the idea that people use distinct processes to make judgments of
specific as opposed to general targets, and specifically the idea that generalities tend to
evoke semantic representations, whereas specific instances evoke 'episodic'
representations. We contend that the representations of specific, identifiable targets are
highly affect-laden, engaging the perceiver at a particularly intense level. But, such a
mediating role of affect has not been tested, including in our own prior work, which
examined generosity toward statistical and identifiable victims, but did not incorporate
measures of affect.
The relevant emotions to examine in the context of punitiveness, we assumed,
would be anger and blame. Prior research has show that perceived intentional harm
evokes anger (Bentacourt & Blair, 1992) as well as blame (e.g., Shaver, 1985), and that
these two emotions interact with one-another. Anger, like sympathy, is a moral emotion,

Identifiability and punitiveness 6
which can produce strong inferences of blame (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1995); Blame,
likewise, intensifies anger, such that anger and blame have a significant recursive
relationship (Quigley, & Tedeschi, 1996). Moreover, reactions of anger and blame
naturally induce a desire to punish (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Solomon, 1990).
Hence, to the extent that identifiable wrongdoers evoke stronger emotional and moral
reactions than unidentifiable wrongdoers, we should expect them to be punished more
severely.
Present Study
Experiment Overview
To test the effect of identifiability on punitiveness, we created a situation in which
participants who had behaved cooperatively in a social dilemma at their own expense
were given the opportunity to penalize another participant who had behaved in a selfinterested fashion at the expense of others.1 Analogous to our earlier study, identifiability
was manipulated by having contributors make the decision either just before or just after
they had drawn the identification number of a non-contributor. Participants made real
decisions about cooperating and punishing which affected their actual payoffs. This is
worth noting because of the emotional mechanism that we propose. If choices were
merely hypothetical, we would expect less of an effect, or no effect at all, since people
generally mispredict their emotions in a hypothetical context (e.g., Van Boven,
Loewenstein, Welch, & Dunning, 2003).
We predicted that people would be more likely to punish, at their own expense, an
identified (determinate) non-contributor more severely than an unidentified
(indeterminate) non-contributor. Second, when given a choice to penalize a non-
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contributor, participants would react with greater anger and blame toward an identified
non-contributor than toward an unidentified non-contributor. Finally, we predicted that
the effect of identifiability (determinateness) on punishment would be mediated by
feelings of anger and blame.
Method
Participants
One hundred and forty undergraduate and masters’ students (58 females and 81
males) at Carnegie Mellon University participated in the study. They received no
participation fee other than whatever sum of money they earned from the game. There
were no significant gender differences on any measure, so male and female data were
combined in all analyses.
Procedure
Participants were recruited in groups of ten. They were seated facing away from
one another and were instructed not to speak or turn around and look at one another
during the course of the experiment. The experimenter informed the participants that all
decisions they made would be anonymous and that, at no point during or after the
experiment, would anyone learn the identity of anyone in their group. Participants were
told that they would receive their payments from the outcome of the game in sealed
envelopes, so that they would learn only about their own payoff from the game.
At the beginning of each experimental session, the experimenter had each
participant draw a number from a bag containing pieces of paper labeled with numbers
from 1-10; each participant drew a single number. Participants were told that the
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experiment would consist of two rounds. Each participant then received the following
written instructions for Round 1:
At the beginning of Round 1 you, and every other participant, receive $5. You
and each of the other 9 group members must decide whether to contribute your $5
to the group or to keep it for yourself. If you contribute the money, then everyone
in the group will receive $1.25 from you. If you do not, then everyone in the
group will receive nothing from you. Therefore, your income from the
experiment depends on what you do and what everyone else does.
If everyone contributes all of their money, including you, then you will all make
$11.25 (9 x $1.25).
If everyone keeps their $5.00 and no one contributes theirs, then everyone will
make $5.00.
The most you can make would be if you keep your money and everyone else
contributes, in which case you would make $16.25.
The least you can make is $0.00 if you contribute your $5.00 and no one else did.
There are many other possibilities, depending on exactly how many people decide
to contribute their $5.00 to the group.
Please make your choice here, buy checking one of the following:
______ I will keep my $5.00
______ I contribute my $5.00 to the group
When you have made your decisions, please turn your packet over and wait for
further instructions.
When all 10 participants had made their decisions, the experimenter collected the
packets. The experimenter then collected each participant’s number and inconspicuously
placed the numbers of those who had not contributed in an envelope. The rest of the
numbers were kept separate.
It was only at this point that the sample from which the data presented here
became fixed; it consists of all participants who contributed in Round 1 and were
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therefore enabled to punish. Each was randomly assigned to either the indeterminate or
determinate condition. Those in the indeterminate condition received the following
instructions:
In this round, the choice you make will affect only one other group member.
Remember that each group member either did not contribute or did contribute
their $5.00 to the project in the first round. You will at no time learn who
contributed and who did not, nor will you learn how many people contributed and
how many did not.
To begin this round, each group member who contributed in round 1 will draw a
number of another member of the same group, who did not contribute. Each of
you will know only the number of the person you draw, but will never find out
who this person is.
You now have the option of punishing this person for not contributing in round 1.
Punishment comes at a cost to yourself though. For every $.20 you pay out, they
will be penalized $1.00 to a maximum punishment of $5.00 (costing you $1.00).
Please check off how much you want to punish them.
____don’t penalize
____penalize by $1.00 (cost to you of $.20)
____penalize by $2.00 (cost to you of $.40)
____penalize by $3.00 (cost to you of $.60)
____penalize by $4.00 (cost to you of $.80)
____penalize by $5.00 (cost to you of $1.00)
Participants were instructed to raise their hand once they had made their decision.
The experimenter approached them, one at a time, with the envelope containing numbers
of non-contributors and the participant then drew the number of the person for whom
they could penalize. All numbers were replaced in the envelope so that in sessions in
which over half of participants contributed and thus could penalize, there would always
be numbers (of non-contributors) to draw.2
In the determinate condition, instructions for contributors were identical except
that participants drew the number of the person to be penalized before making the
decision. In both conditions, after making the choice and drawing a number (in one
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sequence or the other), participants were asked to rate on a likert scale (from 1-5) the
degree of 1) anger, 2) blame, and 3) sympathy they felt for the non-contributing group
member whose number they had drawn.3 Each participant who did not contribute in
Round 1 was subject to any punishment selected by contributor(s) who drew their
number.
Results
Descriptive results
Of the 144 study participants, 55% (n=77) contributed to the group in Round 1.
In Round 2, of the 77 participants who contributed and thus could punish, 53.2% levied
some punishment on a non-contributor (M = $1.79, Mdn. = $1).
Penalties
Since the dependent variable of ‘penalty’ was censored at $0, a Tobit regression
was utilized (Tobin, 1958). Our major hypothesis, that contributors would apply harsher
penalties in the determinate condition than in the indeterminate condition, was supported,

Χ 2 (1, 77) = 4.90, p = .03. The results are detailed in Table 1, and in Figure 1, which
presents a frequency distribution of punishment amounts for the two experimental
groups. From the last row of the table, it is apparent that the determinateness
manipulation affected the magnitude of penalties as well as the tendency to punish. A
greater proportion of participants punished a determinate target than an indeterminate
target. Although the modal punishment was $0 for both conditions, the mean and median
penalty was greater in the determinate condition.
Emotional Reactions
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We also predicted that contributors would react with greater anger and blame
toward determinate non-contributors than toward indeterminate non-contributors.
ANOVA results regressing penalties on each of these variables revealed significant
differences in self-reported anger and blame (F(1, 75) = 25.79, p < .01 and F(1,75) =
8.29, p < .03) respectively. There were no differences in self reported sympathy (F(2, 75)
= .162, n.s.).
Mediational analyses
We predicted that the emotional reactions of anger and blame would mediate the
effect of determinateness on punitiveness, and tested whether this was the case using
Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger's (1998) test of mediation. All of the criteria for full
mediation were satisfied. First, as reported above, there was a significant effect of
determinateness on penalty. Second, there was a significant relationship between
determinateness and a composite measure of anger and blame obtained by averaging the
two measures (F(1, 75)= 10.51, p<.01). Third, when we regressed penalty on both
determinateness and anger/blame, the effect of anger/blame was significant (β = 1.88),

Χ 2 (1, 77) = 33.34, p <.01, but the effect of determinateness vanishes almost completely
after anger/blame is controlled for (β = .04, n.s.). These findings provide clear support
for the hypothesis that identifiability affects behavior by evoking stronger emotions
toward an identified target than toward an unidentified target.
Discussion
The tendency toward more severe punishment for identifiable perpetrators, as
demonstrated by our study, has important implications for public policy, and especially
for jury decision making and the court system.
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Since criminal sentencing inevitably occurs with an identifiable defendant, a juror
might feel anger and blame at a level that is not experienced by policy makers, when they
established the guidelines of appropriate sanctions for particular offenses. This
heightened negative reaction toward offenders at the time of trial, coupled with greater
sympathy for identifiable victims, might lead to harsher sanctions for actual cases than
those set forth by legal guidelines. On the other hand, in actual court cases, factors that
elicit sympathy towards perpetrators, such as a difficult childhood or personal difficulties,
could also have greater impact for identifiable perpetrators at trial than for unidentifiable
perpetrators considered at the time when policy-makers determine generic sanction
levels.
Identifiability could also explain an effective strategy of politicians-- drawing
public attention toward a particular malevolent individual in order to garner support and
mobilize aggressive actions against foreign regimes. Just as focusing on an identifiable
victim (e.g. the Brady bill) is exploited to win support of policies protecting victims, the
emphasis on Saddam Hussein in political speeches and media coverage could serve as a
lightening rod--successfully stirring up anger, thereby motivating a desire to right a
wrong. Other causes without such a salient identifiable perpetrator may seem less
offensive and less in need of opposition.
More generally, this study supports the general conclusion that emotional
reactions to other persons, as well as behaviors directed toward them, depend on a variety
of non-normative factors. For example, both punitiveness and giving have been found to
depend on background mood states (Lerner et al., 1998; Small & Lerner, 2003).
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So far the ramifications of identification have only been demonstrated for
empathy toward victims and punishment of perpetrators, but given the strength and the
consistency of findings in these two areas, it seems likely to subsequent research will
demonstrate a far broader range of applications and support the existence of a more
general "identifiable other" effect.
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Footnotes
_____________________________
1

Similar procedures have been used in previous studies of punishing behavior (e.g.,
Fehr & Gachter, 2000).

2

Contributors replaced drawn numbers due to the inevitable unevenness of the ratio of
contributors to non-contributors in many rounds. Therefore, some non-contributors’
numbers were drawn and potentially punished more than once and some were never
drawn.

3

In addition, we asked, “How likely do you think it is that the non-contributing group
member will actually receive the penalty that you chose?” in order to assess the
believability of the penalty. The mean responses were 3.27 (identifiable) vs. 3.26
(unidentifiable), suggesting that believability was not affected by the experimental
manipulation.

4

As an exploratory measure, non-contributors were given a hypothetical choice about
giving back any amount of their experiment payment to a contributor (either
indeterminate or determinate). Identifiability of the contributor had no effect on this
hypothetical choice. This null result is unsurprising given that participants were
likely insufficiently engaged emotionally in the hypothetical task.
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Table 1
Condition

Indeterminate
Non-contributor (n=38)
$1.29

Determinate
Contributor (n=39)
$2.28

Standard Deviation

$1.92

$2.21

Median

$0.00

$1.00

$0

$0

15.8%

33.3%

60.5%

35.9%

Mean

Mode
Percent of $5.00
(maximum) penalties
Percent of $0.00
(minimum) penalties

Punishment and Identifiability: 18

70%
60%
50%
40%

Indeterminate

30%

Determinate

20%
10%

Penalty

View publication stats

$5.00

$4.00

$3.00

$2.00

$1.00

0%
$0.00

Proportion who penalized
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